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UNDERSTANDING WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION AND BELIEF?
SEUNGBAE PARK
Abstract. Dellsén (2016a) argues that understanding requires neither justification nor be-
lief. I object that ridding understanding of justification and belief comes with the following
costs. (i) No claim about the world can be inferred from what we understand. (ii) We run
into either Moore’s paradox or certain disconcerting questions. (iii) Understanding does not
represent the world. (iv) Understanding cannot take the central place in epistemology. (v)
Understanding cannot be invoked to give an account of scientific progress. (vi) It is not clear
how misunderstanding arises.
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1. Introduction
Understanding is an important part of our mental life. If our best current scientific
theories are true, we understand why an earthquake occurs, why the Earth moves
around the Sun, and why an electron has mass. Many epistemologists and philoso-
phers of science these days are interested in the nature of understanding. Some
philosophers (Kitcher 2002; Lipton 2004; Grimm 2006; 2014) argue that just as
knowledge requires justification and belief, so understanding requires them as well.
By contrast, Finnur Dellsén (2016a) argues that understanding requires neither justi-
fication nor belief. The aim of this paper is to raise issues against Dellsén’s conception
of understanding.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I critically respond to Dellsén’s
example that is intended to show that understanding does not require justification,
arguing that if understanding is devoid of justification, no claim about the world can
be inferred fromwhat we understand. In Section 3, I critically respond to Dellsén’s ex-
ample that is intended to show that understanding requires not belief but acceptance,
arguing that if Dellsén is right, we run into either Moore’s paradox or certain discon-
certing questions. Further problems with Dellsén’s conception of understanding are
that contrary to what he says, understanding is not about the world, cannot take
the place of knowledge in epistemology, and cannot be invoked to give an account
of scientific progress. Finally, I point out that it is not clear how misunderstanding
arises.
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2. No Justification
This section examines an example that Dellsén has provided to argue that “under-
standing does not require justification” (Dellsén 2016a, p.4). The example concerns
Bernie, a retired automobile mechanic living in a rural area. He has good reason to
believe that a conman’s testimony is untrustworthy, but acquires some understanding
as a result of attending to the con man’s testimony:
Case 2. Bernie is a retired automobile mechanic living in a very small town
in rural America. One morning Bernie reads in the local newspaper that a
convicted confidence man is coming to town. The story included a picture of
the man and the following warning: ‘This man will try to scam you, so don’t
believe a word he says’. The next day, the con man is driving past Bernie’s
house when his car suddenly breaks down. The con man rings on Bernie’s
doorbell, and Bernie opens the door. Recognizing the con man face from the
newspaper, Bernie decides to stay inside his house while conversing with the
conman. The conman tells Bernie what appears to be wrongwith the car and
solicits Bernie’s assistance. Based only on the con man’s description of the
car’s behavior immediately before the breakdown (all of which is accurate),
Bernie immediately diagnoses the problem as a broken timing belt (which
is correct). Yet Bernie is not justified in believing this, since he should know
better than to trust a convicted con man. (Dellsén 2016a, p.5)
This example is intended to show that Bernie is not justified in believing that the
con man’s car does not work, that the con man’s description of the car’s symptoms is
true, and that the timing belt is broken, but to show additionally that “Bernie clearly
understands what’s wrong with the con man’s car” (Dellsén 2016a, p.8).
Let me make what I take to be an important point with respect to the example
above. Suppose that Bernie had the following conversation with his philosophical
opponent, Bob:
Bob: Please state the understanding you just acquired from what the con
man said.
Bernie: The con man’s car doesn’t work because the timing belt is broken.
Bob: Are you justified in believing the con man’s car doesn’t work, or the
timing belt is broken?
Bernie: No, I’m not.
Bob: If so, how can you say to me the con man’s car doesn’t work because the
timing belt is broken? Do you expect me to believe what you are not justified
in believing?
Bernie: Oh, let me put my position more precisely. I don’t know whether the
con man has a car or not, whether his car works or not, and whether the
timing belt is broken or not. That is not important for my understanding
of the possible problem with his car. From what he said, I can understand
what might have happened, i.e., it might be that the con man’s car is broken
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because the timing belt is broken.
Bob: If so, you are not justified in believing that your understanding agrees
with a state of affairs, i.e., in believing that what you understand reflects the
world.
Dellsén might be right that “Bernie clearly understands what’s wrong with the con
man’s car” (Dellsén 2016a, p.6). But it is merely an accident that what Bernie under-
stands corresponds to the state of affairs that the con man’s car is broken. In other
words, Bernie is not justified in believing that what he understands reflects the world.
Accordingly, he cannot make an inference about the world. He cannot infer, for ex-
ample, that he has an opportunity to make some money by fixing the car, or that
he would see the car once he steps out of his house. How can he make such infer-
ences when he does not even believe that there is a car outside of his house? Only
an irrational person would make such inferences. By contrast, if Bernie is justified in
believing that the con man’s car does not work because the timing belt is broken, he
is justified in inferring that he has an opportunity to make some money by fixing the
car, and that he can see the car once he steps out of his house. In short, if Dellsén
is right that understanding is devoid of justification, we cannot make any inference
about the world from what we understand, and understanding cannot help us guide
our actions in the world.
3. No Belief
Dellsén (2016a, pp.10–11) claims that understanding requires not belief but accep-
tance, appealing to L. Jonathan Cohen’s (1992) distinction between belief and ac-
ceptance. For Cohen, to believe that p is to be disposed to feel that it is true, whereas
to accept that p is to adopt the policy of including p “among one’s premises for de-
ciding what to do or think in a particular context” (1992, p.4). To use his example,
a defense attorney may accept that his client is innocent, although he believes that
his client is guilty. To accept that his client is innocent means to use the proposition
that his client is innocent as a premise for deciding what to think and what to speak
in court. If he accepts that his client is innocent, the way he speaks in court is exactly
the same as the way he would have spoken if he believed that his client was innocent.
In other words, there is no verbal difference between a person who accepts that p
and another person who believes that p in a particular context.
Dellsén argues that “understanding something may merely involve treating cer-
tain propositions or theories as given in the context of explaining something, as op-
posed to being disposed to feel that the propositions or theories are true” (2016a,
p.10). For example, Carrie, a theoretical physicist, does not believe that string theory
is true, but she accepts that it is true. Even if she merely accepts that it is true, she
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can use “it in explanations of various natural phenomena” (2016a, p.11):
In this case, it seems clear that Carrie understands the fundamental structure
of her world that string theory is meant to describe. After all, Carrie can use
the theory to explain any fundamental physical phenomena just as well as
someone who also believes string theory (and better than someone who does
not accept string theory. (Dellsén 2016a, p.11)
So it does not matter whether Carrie believes or merely accepts that string theory
is true. She can use it to explain and understand the fundamental structure of the
world. Dellsén, however, does not specify how Carrie can explain and understand the
fundamental structure of the world that string theory is meant to describe.
Let me specify how Carrie might explain and understand the fundamental struc-
ture of the world in terms of string theory. According to string theory, everything
is ultimately made out of tiny filaments of energy called strings. Strings vibrate in
different frequencies, which are responsible for the existence of different particles:
electrons, quarks, photons, and gravitons. The way strings vibrate is determined by
the geometry of extra dimensions. The extra dimensions are so small that we cannot
see them. String theory requires eleven dimensions: one dimension of time and ten
dimensions of space. No experiment has yet been performed to test string theory.
Scientists, however, believe that a particle accelerator could be used to confirm
string theory. Imagine that two particles move in opposite directions at nearly the
speed of light and collide with each other. Imagine also that the amount of energy
after the collision is smaller than the amount of energy before the collision. Such an
experimental result would confirm string theory because it can be explained by the
hypothesis that some energy is forced into the extra dimensions.
Is it plausible that Carrie can explain and understand the fundamental structure
of the world in terms of string theory by merely accepting that string theory is true?
My answer is no. Imagine that the experiment depicted above is performed, that the
expected outcome obtains, and that Carrie has the following conversation with her
philosophical opponent, Bob:
Bob: Do you understand why the amount of energy after the collision is
smaller than that of energy before the collision?
Carrie: Yes, I do. The amount of energy after the collision is smaller than that
of energy before the collision because some energy is forced into the extra
dimensions.
Bob: Do you believe the amount of energy after the collision is smaller than
that of energy before the collision because some energy is forced into the
extra dimensions?
Carrie: No, I don’t. But I accept the amount of energy after the collision is
smaller than that of energy before the collision because some energy is forced
into the extra dimensions.
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Bob: Even if you merely accept that, you are caught in Moore’s paradox. Your
sentence has the form: p, but I don’t believe that p, although I accept that
p. It contains a Moorean sentence: p, but I don’t believe that p (Park 2016,
pp.77–79).
Moore’s paradox occurs when we assert a sentence of the form, “P, but I don’t believe
p” or “P, but I believe not p” (Moore 1993, pp.207–212). Carrie in effect said above,
“The amount of energy after the collision is smaller than that of energy before the
collision because some energy is forced into the extra dimensions, but I don’t believe
the amount of energy after the collision is smaller than that of energy before the
collision because some energy is forced into the extra dimensions”. So she is caught
in Moore’s paradox. Researchers on Moore’s paradox agree that it is absurd to assert
a Moorean sentence, and that the absurdity originates from a contradiction, but they
disagree over wherein the contradiction lies (Park 2014, p.345).
What is important for the purpose of this paper is that we run into Moore’s para-
dox when we express what we understand and then declare that we do not believe
what we understand. It appears, therefore, that to avoid Moore’s paradox, we should
believe what we understand. Thus, if you eliminate belief from understanding, you
owe us an account of how you can avoid Moore’s paradox.
Carrie might try to circumvent Moore’s paradox by not declaring that she does
not believe what she understands, i.e., by not saying to Bob, “I don’t believe the
amount of energy after the collision is smaller than that of energy before the collision
because some energy is forced into the extra dimensions”. This move, however, invites
a different sort of objection. Bob could then ask Carrie some disconcerting questions
(Park 2018, Section 4): “Do you believe the amount of energy after the collision is
smaller than that of energy before the collision because some energy is forced into
the extra dimensions? If not, how can you say to me what you don’t believe? Do you
expect me to believe what you don’t? Why should I believe what you don’t?” Thus,
if belief is not a requirement of understanding, we run into either Moore’s paradox
or these disconcerting questions. Cohen’s notion of acceptance cannot rescue Bernie
from Moore’s paradox or such disconcerting questions.1
Let me raise a different sort of objection to Dellsén’s contention that understand-
ing does not require belief. It is a double standard to believe that an explanandum
is true while merely accepting that an explanans is true. We ought to treat an ex-
planandum and an explanans consistently, which requires that we believe both the
explanandum and the explanans, or that we merely accept both the explanandum
and the explanans. So Carrie ought not to believe but merely accept that the amount
of energy after the collision is smaller than that of energy before the collision. If she
believes that the explanandum is true, she owes us an account of why she treats the
explanans and the explanandum differently. The same point applies to the previous
example of the defense attorney. Given that he merely accepts that his client is inno-
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cent, and then infers that his client was not at the crime scene, he should also merely
accept that his client was not at the crime scene. In sum, it is illegitimate to merely
accept some propositions while believing other propositions.
To merely accept all propositions involved in an understanding means that the
understanding does not represent the world, i.e., it has nothing to do with the world.
This corollary is obvious, once we consider the fundamental difference between be-
lief and acceptance. A belief is a mental state that is either true or false, depending on
whether it correctly or incorrectly represents the world. By contrast, an acceptance is
not a mental state that can be true or false, i.e., it is not a mental state that represents
the world. Recall that to accept a proposition is to adopt the policy of using the propo-
sition as a premise, to use Cohen’s (1992, p.4) expression, or to treat the proposition
as given, to use Dellsén’s (2016a, p.10) expression. Adopting a policy or treating a
proposition can neither be true nor be false. It can at best be useful or useless. For
example, the defense attorney’s acceptance that his client is innocent can be useful
or useless, depending on whether it helps to win his case. The acceptance would be
useless if the prosecutor presents undeniable proof that the defendant is guilty. Thus,
if acceptance, as opposed to belief, is an essential ingredient of understanding, un-
derstanding does not represent the world, and hence it does not even give us a clue
as to what the world looks like.
This point can be illustrated by an example. Imagine that two children have the
following quarrel over two imaginary figures, Superman and Batman:
Child 1: Who wins if Superman and Batman fight with each other?
Child 2: Of course, Superman wins. After all, he can lift up a heavy rock as
large as a mountain. Moreover, he can fly. But Batman can do none of these
things.
Child 1: No, Batman wins. He only needs to carry Kryptonite.
Child 2: I understand.
Both children understand how Batman can beat Superman. They do not, however,
believe that Superman and Batman are real, and hence that Kryptonite makes Super-
man powerless. They merely accept these propositions, i.e., they merely use them as
premises for the conclusion that Batman could beat Superman. The inference from
the premises to the conclusion gives rise to the understanding of how Batman could
beat Superman.
The children’s understanding fits Dellsén’s conception of understanding, but does
not represent the world. The children know that Batman and Superman are not real.
They do not feel that the propositions about Batman and Superman are true. But
they understand how Batman can defeat Superman. Their understanding does not
imply that they have an insight into the world, or that they understand how the
world works. To generalize, if acceptance, as opposed to belief, is an ingredient of
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understanding, to understand why p is merely a matter of grasping some propositions
independently of the way the world operates. Such a mental state cannot accurately
guide our actions in the world.
By contrast, suppose that the standard model of particle physics is true, that par-
ticle physicists believe that it is true, and hence they believe that a particle has mass
because it interacts with the Higgs field. Under such conditions, particle physicists
understand why a particle has mass, their understanding is about the world, and it
contains an insight into the world. Moreover, since their understanding reflects the
world, it can guide their actions in the world. Of course, the standard model of parti-
cle physics might be false, but if it is false, then particle physicists do not understand
but rather misunderstand why a particle has mass.
Dellsén says that “Carrie understands the fundamental structure of her world that
string theory is meant to describe” (2016a, p.11). Such a locution indicates that Dell-
sén takes understanding to be about the world, i.e., he believes that understanding
represents the world. It is not clear, however, how he can say so when he claims that
understanding is free of belief. It is not clear how Carrie can understand the funda-
mental structure of the universe that the string theory is meant to describe by merely
accepting it. It claims that the universe has extra dimensions. Carrie uses the propo-
sition that the universe has the extra dimensions as a premise for her inferences.
But she does not believe that the universe has the extra dimensions. Under such a
condition, Carrie does not understand the fundamental structure of the world that
string theory is meant to describe. The fundamental structure of the universe lies be-
yond the scope of her understanding. Of course, this does not mean that she does not
have any understanding at all. She has an understanding in that she grasps how the
propositions of string theory are related to one another. Such an understanding has
nothing to do with the world. The same criticism applies to the example of Bernie
and the con man. Dellsén claims that “Bernie clearly understands what’s wrong with
the con man’s car” (2016a, p.6). Again, such a locution indicates that Dellsén takes
understanding to reflect the world. Notice, however, that Bernie does not even be-
lieve that the con man has a car. If so, it is not clear how Dellsén can say that Bernie
clearly understands what is wrong with the con man’s car. Bernie merely accepts that
the con man has a car, that his car does not work, and that the timing belt is broken.
He merely uses these propositions for his inference that if the car were broken, that
would be because the timing belt is broken. The problem with the con man’s car, the
state of affairs, lies beyond the scope of Bernie’s understanding.
In the face of my preceding criticism, Dellsén might distinguish between under-
standings that represent the world and understandings that do not represent the
world, and then claim that belief is an essential component of the former, but not of
the latter. An example of understanding that represents the world would be physicists’
understanding of the structure of spacetime, on condition that the general theory of
Principia 21(2): 379–389 (2017).
386 Seungbae Park
relativity is true, and on condition that they believe that it is true. An example of un-
derstanding that does not represent the world would be the children’s understanding
of how Batman can beat Superman. The propositions about Batman and Superman
are false, and the children do not believe that they are true.
A problem with the preceding move is that it is a mistake to rid understanding
of belief, and then to claim that understanding represents the world. For example,
it would be a mistake for Dellsén to say that Carrie merely accepts string theory,
and then to claim that she has an understanding of the fundamental structure of the
world. How can she understand the fundamental structure of the world when she
does not even believe that the fundamental structure of the world is real? She only
understands how the propositions of string theory are related to one another, just
as the children understand how the propositions about Superman and Batman are
related to one another. Her understanding and the children’s understanding do not
reflect the world at all, i.e., their understandings do not contain information about
the world. It follows that they cannot make any inference about the world from what
they understand.
Let me raise another objection to Dellsén’s conception of understanding. It is not
clear how misunderstanding arises under his framework. If acceptance is an essen-
tial ingredient of understanding, it is problematic to say that understanding arises
when its constituent acceptance is true, and that misunderstanding arises when its
constituent acceptance is false. As already said, an acceptance is not a mental state
that is capable of being true or false. By contrast, if belief is an essential component
of understanding, we can say that understanding arises when its constituent belief is
true, and that misunderstanding arises when its constituent belief is false.
Let me flesh out the preceding objection with an example. According to Aris-
totelian mechanics, an apple falls down because it has the purpose of returning to
its natural place, which is the center of the universe. Obviously, Aristotelians misun-
derstood why the apple fell down. There can be two different explanations of why
they misunderstood the phenomena. The first one holds that they misunderstood the
phenomena because they accepted Aristotelian mechanics and their acceptance was
false. The second one holds that they misunderstood the phenomenon because they
believed Aristotelian mechanics and their belief was false. The first explanation is
problematic, whereas the second one is not.
Let me elucidate two implications of my preceding criticisms against Dellsén’s
conception of understanding. First, Dellsén cites the view that “understanding should
replace knowledge as the primary focus of epistemology” (2016a, p.1). This view
is defended by Linda Zagzebski (2001), Jonathan Kvanvig (2003), Catherine Elgin
(2006), and Duncan Pritchard (2010). It seems to me, however, that knowledge has
traditionally taken the central place in epistemology because it is a mental state that
is connected with the world. Epistemologists’ interest in knowledge stems from their
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interest in what the world looks like, and what we can do with the use of knowledge.
If, however, understanding is a mental state that is disconnected from the world,
it is not clear why it should take the central place in epistemology. Knowledge is
power, but understanding is not, if Dellsén is right that understanding is devoid of
justification and belief.
Dellsén’s view on the place of understanding in epistemology is slightly differ-
ent from the one that he cites above. He says that “knowledge and understanding
should coexist as two separate focus points for epistemology” (Dellsén 2016a, p.14).
My response to this view is to admit that knowledge and understanding can coexist
in epistemology, but to add that understanding is not as important as knowledge in
epistemology for the reason stated above, viz., knowledge is power, whereas under-
standing is not. To go further, the task of investigating the nature of understanding
can be undertaken not by epistemologists but by philosophers of mind.
Second, philosophers of science advance various accounts of scientific progress.
They claim that scientific progress consists in the accumulation of knowledge (Bird
2007; Park 2017), the increase in verisimilitude (Niiniluoto 1980; 2014), the in-
crease in problem-solving capabilities (Kuhn 1962[1970]; Laudan 1977; 1984), and
“in increasing understanding” (Dellsén 2016b, p.73). Dellsén’s idea is that as science
progresses, we come to understand the world more and more. For example, scien-
tific progress was made when Newtonian mechanics was replaced by Einsteinian me-
chanics, and we understand more about the world as a result of the replacement of
Newtonian mechanics with Einsteinian mechanics. If, however, understanding does
not represent the world, it is problematic to say that as science progresses, we come
to understand the world more and more. Consider also that as science progresses, we
can control more and more parts of the world. It is not clear how Dellsén’s account
of scientific progress can accommodate this aspect of scientific progress. Recall that
his account of understanding entails that understanding does not help us guide our
actions.
4. Conclusion
Dellsén argues that understanding requires neither justification nor belief. Ridding
understanding of justification and belief, however, comes with the following costs.
No inference about the world can be made from what we understand. We run into
either Moore’s paradox or certain disconcerting questions. Understanding does not
represent the world, contrary to what Dellsén says, and therefore can neither take
the central place in epistemology nor be invoked to account for scientific progress.
Finally, it is not clear howmisunderstanding arises. In sum, no belief about the world?
No understanding about the world! No justified belief about the world? No inference
about the world!
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Notes
1There are further problems with explaining an explanandum by merely accepting an ex-
planans. It is unethical to do so in certain social contexts (Park 2015, pp.225–228). Moreover,
if scientists merely accept their data, they are opening themselves to the accusation that they
have fabricated them (Park 2017, pp.2–3).
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